Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism by Cockram, Nathan Robert
Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism
Nathan Robert Cockram
Department of Philosophy, Carleton University
e purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Hilary Kornblith’s (2002) argument for
excluding conceptual analysis from epistemological inquiry, and then provide three
objections to it. More specically, Kornblith argues that epistemological properties
such as knowledge reduce to natural kinds (with a constitutive essence) which can
only be discovered and investigated using the a posteriori methods of the natural
sciences. us, he continues, conceptual analysis cannot properly illuminate the
target domain. e three objections to Kornblith’s argument which I present are
as follows: (i) Multiple Realizeability, (ii) Psychological Explanation, (iii) Starting
Points. On strength of these objections, I conclude that Kornblith’s brand of a pos-
teriori epistemology both eliminates our ability to make epistemic evaluations in
general, and also implies a strong form of scepticism.
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1. Introduction
Hilary Kornblith (2002) argues in favour of a metaepistemological thesis
which I call ‘Exclusionary Naturalism’ (EN). EN contends that the relevant
target domain of philosophical analysis is populated by empirical natural
kinds. Kornblith takes this thesis as placing signicant adequacy constraints
upon any naturalistically respectable metaepistemology for the following
reason. It is generally accepted that consulting our a priori application in-
tuitions regarding a predicate can only generate and justify inferences rang-
ing over what is conceptually possible. According to Kornblith, however,
what we are really interested is an a posteriori and empirical account of the
phenomenon as it exists here “in the world” (Kornblith 2002, 13–20).us—
and this is the crux of EN—Kornblith denies that the deliverances of a priori
analysis can be justied vis-à-vis the relevant target domain.1 While we will
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1 Note that Kornblith does not deny that we have a priori beliefs per se; rather his thesis is
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2 Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism
have application intuitions about the extension of a predicate at some sce-
nario e, they carry no evidential weight because, to continue the argument,
all justied beliefs about a particular concept F, where F is a natural kind,
must ultimately derive from empirical sources.
Importantly, then, on Kornblith’s view commitment to a robust natu-
ralism entails a rejection of a priori analysis: because the targets of inquiry
are natural kinds, a priori analysis has no place in epistemology proper. My
primary aim in this paper will be to show that the general line of argumen-
tation Kornblith recruits in favour of the EN thesis—which I will call the
‘Exclusionary Argument’ (EA), fails to do the justicatory work required in
order to establish EN.us, the conclusion I wish to establish is that his a
posteriori program in epistemology poses no signicant threat to the use of
application intuitions or intuitional methodology.
My argument will proceed in two stages: rst, (section 2) I will examine
Kornblith’s Exclusionary Argument as presented in his 2002 book. Second,
I will then proceed (sections 3-5) with arguments designed to show that it
does not successfully establish what Kornblith needs in order to set his Ex-
clusionary Naturalism on rm ground.
2. e Exclusionary Argument Reconstructed
Kornblith thinks that a priori analysis is naturalistically suspect and must
be discarded because it cannot yield justied beliefs about epistemic kinds
considered as natural kinds. e Exclusionary Argument attempts to es-
tablish this by moving from (a) a metaphysical premise about the status of
knowledge as a natural kind to (b) a methodological conclusion stipulating
adequacy constraints upon the proper domain of naturalistic inquiry. Put
briey, Kornblith argues that because a priori analysis cannot justify beliefs
about natural kinds, it therefore falls outside of the naturalist’s (scientic)2
methodological purview and must be discarded.
To begin, consider the following argument, which I believe is a very plau-
sible reconstruction of EA:
(1) If epistemology is to bemethodologically naturalized in a thorough-
going manner, then it cannot retain scientically suspect methods.
(2) Epistemology is to be methodologically naturalized in a thorough-
going manner.
Kornblith and ‘radical empiricist’ proponents of naturalized epistemology such as Quine
(at least Quine on a popular reading) who seem to propose a complete elimination of the
a priori. See (BonJour 1998, chapter 3) and (Quine 1969).
2 For more, see (Papineau 2009).
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(3) erefore, epistemology cannot retain scientically suspect meth-
ods.
(4) If an epistemological method cannot illuminate the natural kind(s)
that stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within
its target domain, then it is a scientically suspect method.
(5) A priori analysis alone cannot illuminate the natural kind(s) that
stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within its
target domain.3
(6) erefore, a priori analysis is a scientically suspect method.
(7) erefore, epistemology cannot retain a priori analysis.
Reconstructing EA in this manner allows us to see exactly how Korn-
blith infers methodological adequacy constraints from explicitly metaphys-
ical considerations.e key to the inference in question is premise (5): no-
tice that it presupposes that target terms of epistemological interest, such as
‘knowledge’, ‘knows’, ‘justied belief ’ etc. refer to natural kinds. In arming
the antecedent of the conditional statement made in (4) on explicitly meta-
physical grounds (i.e. knowledge as a natural kind), then, (5) sets up Korn-
blith’s overall conclusion that a methodologically naturalized epistemology
cannot retain a priori analysis. In other words, from a kind identication
comes a methodological constraint upon the naturalization project: a pri-
ori methods are fundamentally unsuited to the study of a natural, empirical
subject matter and should be dropped by the naturalist.
Given, then, the importance of the epistemic kinds as natural kinds view
presupposed by (5) in the Exclusionary Argument, Kornblith attempts to in-
dependently motivate the premise with a subargument motivated by evolu-
tionary considerations. I now want to consider his subargument in some
detail, for coming to grasp with it will be of great importance to my critique
of the Exclusionary Argument below.
2.1 Knowledge as a Natural Phenomenon
Kornblith, as I read him, advocates the following theory of knowledge: it is
a reliable, information-bearing cognitive state that is the product of natural
selection; a state that, in playing an explanatory role in the prediction of
animal behavior, is best viewed as a natural kind.
3 anks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I add the qualier ‘alone’ to this
premise. is, I think, both renders my argument more faithful to Kornblith’s position,
and at the same time makes it more substantive.
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e argument has three stages. First, Kornblith stipulates thatDarwinian
natural selection is a plausible theoretical explanation for understanding
how organisms possess truth-conducive informational states (or ‘beliefs’, in
Kornblith’s terminology) about their external environment. Second, build-
ing upon this evolutionary view, he argues that these selected-for beliefs are,
in fact, best interpreted as a type of species-level knowledge. ird, Korn-
blith concludes that knowledge is properly viewed as a natural kind: it plays
an integral and a unifying role in the prediction and explanation of the suc-
cessful adaptation of organisms to environmental requirements.
2.1.1 Natural Selection
Natural environments make substantive informational demands upon the
organisms which inhabit them, demands which require that successful or-
ganisms process external inputs, integrate these inputs as beliefs, and orga-
nize behavior accordingly; where this includes (at minimum) survival and
reproduction.4 Given that many organisms are successful in meeting these
demands, what would adequately explain this capacity?
Kornblith (1985, 4f) invokes Darwinian natural selection:
AsQuine suggests, “ere is some Encouragement in Darwin.” Crea-
tures whose belief generating mechanisms do not aord cognitive
contact with the world have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to
die before reproducing this kind. Since believing truths has survival
value, the survival of the ttest guarantees that our innate intellectual
endowment gives us a predisposition for believing truths.
As suggested here, the rough idea behind Darwinian natural selection
is that successful organisms have evolved over tens of thousands of years to
possess biological or cognitive processes which bias or have a predisposi-
tion towards generating true beliefs about their external environment. e
reason is that true beliefs about the external world allow an organism to ne-
gotiate its environment and reproduce successfully (where, generally, false
beliefs would not). So, the positive survival value of these processes is such
that they would have been selected for at the species level via the process of
evolutionary adaptation (Kornblith 2002, 56–61).
Darwin’s theory of natural selection thus provides a powerful tool for ex-
plaining the tendency for organisms to possess processes which (in general)
yield mostly true beliefs about their environment—producing true beliefs is
conducive to survival and reproduction (Kornblith 2002, 56–59).
4 Roughly, the proper scope of Darwinian evolution is the level of species, rather than indi-
viduals. at is, while individual genetic variation is the primary means by which evolu-
tionary pressures are exerted, this genetic variation produces or manifests itself as group
or species-level traits. For more, see (Sober and Wilson 1998).
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2.1.2 Knowledge as External Informational State
e second stage turns on a further, distinctly epistemological question: as-
suming that organisms display an evolved capacity to form true beliefs about
their external environments, can we classify this capacity as a kind of knowl-
edge? Kornblith answers in the armative. I begin with a revealing passage:
. . .Explanation of successful behavior. . . requires the notion of knowl-
edge rather than mere belief. . . [e] true beliefs that particular [ani-
mals] acquire will be the product of a stable capacity for the produc-
tion of true beliefs.e resulting true beliefs are not merely acciden-
tally true; they are produced by a cognitive capacity that is attuned
to its environment. In a word, the beliefs are reliably produced. e
concept of knowledge which is of interest here thus requires reliably
produced true belief . . . (Kornblith 2002, 57–58, italics added)
For Kornblith, the property which converts true beliefs (considered as
informational states) into knowledge is reliability. e argument here is
based upon explanatory ascent. When we consider the cognitive capaci-
ties of token organisms, the epistemic category mere belief is explanatorily
adequate. is is because the cognitive abilities of an individual organism
vis-à-vis its particular environment are suciently “accidental” (presum-
ably through the workings of genetic variation) to be captured by a term
compatible with epistemic luck. When we consider the cognitive capacities
of a species, however, the category mere belief becomes explanatorily de-
cient. is is because the cognitive capacities a successful species displays
are, when considered as a type (Kornblith 2002, 61–62), suciently non-
accidental and reliable to confer a higher degree of epistemic value upon the
informational states they produce.
Note that Kornblith’s conception of epistemic justication—of whatever
it is beyond true belief that yields knowledge—and hence his conception of
knowledge, is rmly externalist: as long as an internal belief-forming process
meets the external condition of reliability, the true beliefs it produces will be
justied and amount to knowledge.5
2.1.3 External Informational States as Natural Kinds
e third phase of Kornblith’s argument makes the case for knowledge as a
natural kind. It runs as follows. First, two necessary conditions for natural
kind membership based on a “cluster kind” theory are stipulated. Second,
he argues that ‘knowledge’ denotes a kind which satises the two aforemen-
tioned conditions.
5 See Kornblith 2002, 61–69
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Beginning with the initial stipulation of conditions for natural kind-
hood, Kornblith says the following. A predicate denotes a natural kind if and
only if two conditions are satised: (i) the predicate refers to a set of robustly
co-occurring and mutually supporting properties which form a “homeo-
static cluster”;6 and (ii), these co-occurring properties are “projectable”; i.e.
they persist through external change and gure centrally in causal/nomo-
logical explanations. In other words, then, a natural kind is an entity con-
stituted by set of “bundled” properties which are both mutually supporting,
causally ecacious and demonstrate a regularity which supports inductive
inference.
Relying on this basic cluster kinds framework, Kornblith argues that
the class of informational states designated by the process-related state type
‘Knowledge’ displays all of the relevant characteristics of causally ecacious
homeostatic clusters, and thus can be properly designated a natural kind. He
says:
Animal knowledge. . . [is] such a. . . category, a category that features
prominently in causal explanations, and thus in successful inductive
predictions. If we wish to explain why it is that members of a species
have survived, we need to appeal to the causal role of the animals’
knowledge of their environment. . . e knowledge that members
of a species embody is the locus of a homeostatic cluster of proper-
ties: true beliefs that are reliably produced, that are instrumental in
the prediction of behavior successful in meeting biological needs and
thereby implicated in the Darwinian explanation of the selective re-
tention of traits. (Kornblith 2002, 62)
And furthermore:
Understandingwhat that theoretical unity is is the object of our study,
and it is to be found by careful examination of the phenomenon, that
is, something outside of us, not our concept of the phenomenon, some-
thing inside of us. In short, I see. . . knowledge. . . [as a] natural kind.
(Kornblith 2002, 11, italics added)
In other words, the process-type “Knowledge” denotes an external (in
the epistemological sense outlined above) set of co-occurring and mutually
6 Cluster Kinds theory attempts to reconcile the semantic intuitions implied by causal the-
ories of reference with biological arguments for kind-membership indeterminacy. More
specically, proponents such as Richard Boyd (1980, 1988) argue that while a particular
kind t does have an underlying physical structure, membership of t is determined by the
presence of the relevant set of clustered properties. e insight here is that there are no
strict necessary and sucient conditions for membership of t; rather it is the presence of
a property cluster approximating other members of the set. Kinds, then, are a posteriori
but vague. See (Kornblith 2002, 61–62).
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supporting homeostatic properties, a set which features prominently in the
prediction and causal explanation of the behavior of complex organisms.
us, according to Kornblith, knowledge—the kind that stands as the
referential content of ‘knowledge’—satises the conditions required to be a
natural kind according to his preferred account.
2.2 e Purported Methodological Upshot
With the three-part subargument for knowledge as a natural kind outlined
in 2.1, we can now see more clearly what work it does in providing justica-
tory support for the crucial premise (i.e. (5)) of the Exclusionary Argument,
and consequently howKornblith uses it to draw substantive methodological
constraints upon the naturalization project.
Kornblith’s inference from knowledge as a natural kind to a method-
ological sanction of a priori analysis is, on the face of it, relatively straight-
forward: establishing that knowledge is a cluster-kind of natural properties
implies that we cannot learn anything about it via a priori analysis. is
is because such cluster-kinds are individuated by local empirical conditions;
meaning that they can only be discovered via a posteriori investigation of the
external (i.e. actual) world. As a result, analyzing our pre-empirical concept
of knowledge in isolation of such an investigation cannot yield any justied
deliverances about the target phenomenon:
. . . Since our ultimate target is the phenomenon [itself]. . .wewould do
better to study those extra-mental phenomena directly. . .e investi-
gatorwho is interested in aluminumwill learn little about his target by
studying folk concepts of aluminum. He will learn more by studying
the concepts of sophisticated chemists. . . [and] to look at aluminum
itself. (Kornblith 2007, 36)
Just as we must investigate the kind Aluminum rather than the concept,
we must investigate the kind Knowledge, not the concept; for concepts can-
not illuminate natural kinds, only the world can.
So, the subargument for knowledge as a natural cluster-kind outlined in
2.1 (c), i.e.:
(A) If a term denotes a co-occurring set of properties which: (i) con-
stitute a “Homeostatic Cluster”, (ii) this set is “projectable”; i.e. it
persists through external change and gures centrally in causal/no-
mological explanations, then this term denotes a natural kind.
(B) e term ‘knowledge’ denotes a co-occurring set of propertieswhich
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii).
(C) erefore, ‘knowledge’ denotes a natural kind.
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appears to be pulling the justicatory weight in support of Kornblith’s
methodological stricture contained in premise (5) of the exclusionary ar-
gument:
(5) A priori analysis alone cannot illuminate the natural kind(s) that
stands as the referential content of the term(s) contained within its
target domain.
is cannot be the full extent of Kornblith’s argument, however. For the
cluster-kinds view argued for in (a)–(d) is—and this point I stress—without
further supplementation, too weak to support the methodological stricture
expressed in premise (5).e reason is that cluster-kinds per se are conceptu-
ally compatible with a token physicalismwhich construes the relevant prop-
erties in higher-order (descriptivist) and functional terms; in which case im-
plying that they would be amenable to a priori analysis. More specically,
the reason why cluster-kinds construed in higher-order or functional terms
would fail to rule out the relevant methodological stricture is based upon
semantic considerations. For because (assuming token physicalism) such
higher-order properties are not extensionally equivalent to the base proper-
ties which instantiate them, the reference of their associated terms is medi-
ated (in the Russellian descriptivist sense) by their descriptive (intensional)
content.is is very important, for it implies that propositions regarding the
extension of the particular higher-order term can be justied a priori by an-
alyzing the relevant descriptive content of the scenario in question; blocking
Kornblith’s desired conclusion.7
Subsequently, on further examination it becomes clear that Kornblith
intends to strengthen the cluster kind view of knowledge by committing to
a causal theory of reference and essentialism about natural kinds. e fol-
lowing passage, I think, makes this quite explicit:
[Conceptual analysis] is just oneway tomark [the extension of a term];
causal theorists of reference have another (and tomymind, better) ac-
count. . . it remains to be shown why our folk epistemological notions
are of epistemological interest in their own right. Why should our
folk epistemological notions be of any more interest to epistemolo-
gists than out folk chemical notions are to chemists? (Kornblith 2002,
18–19)8
7 For more, see (Kripke 1980).
8 Also, consider the following suggestive passage from (Kornblith 2005, 438): “Just as the
sciences empirically discover the essential properties of natural kinds such as water, an
empirical investigation of the phenomenon of knowledge may discover the very features
which make it what it is. On my view, a proper account of knowledge would give us an
account of its necessary properties, just as a proper scientic account of the nature of water
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Adopting the semantics of a causal theory of reference strongly suggests
thatKornblith considers each property cluster-type to be extensionally equiv-
alent (type-identical) to an essential physical or compositional kind (viz.
“kind essentialism”).9 Roughly, the Causal theory of reference claims that
proper names and natural kind terms are semantic primitives, meaning that
they directly pick out or denote their bearer.is is in contrast to Descrip-
tivist theories of reference, which claim that such terms denote via the satis-
faction of a semantically complex description. So, on the Causal account, a
natural kind term denotes what it does not through the satisfaction of some
complex description “in the head”, but rather through a causal chain leading
back to an initial baptism or designation. Now, importantly, because natural
kind terms do not denote via description, a natural kind term can refer to
one natural kind in one world and a dierent natural kind in another world
even if the kinds referred to have exactly the same descriptive properties or
“modes of presentation” (e.g. ‘Clear, potable, drinkable liquid’. . . ); the kind
referred to in each case is instead individuated by whatever compositional
structure is picked out in the particular modal scenario in question (H2O or
XYZ).is is why the Causal theory is essentialist: all and only those worlds
containing H2O are worlds in which ‘water’ refers to water, for water just
is H2O—‘water’ is a “rigid designator”. is move, I emphasize, is the key
to Kornblith’s defence of the purported methodological upshot of the nat-
ural kinds view of knowledge; for it provides the strong modal tie between
property clusters and compositional kinds that he needs. More specically,
it allows Kornblith to claim that the meaning of ‘Knowledge’, as an unmedi-
ated semantic primitive, is a direct function of its referential content (i.e.
the constituent of the proposition is just the object itself); which in turn is
determined by the local compositional kind the term rigidly designates.
It follows from this account, then, that ‘knowledge’ has as its referential
content a phenomenon that is only capable of being investigated a posteriori;
for we only, epistemically speaking, come to know the relevant essential kind
(and thus the referential content of the term) by empirical investigation of the
actual world.
As a result, adopting the causal theory of reference (and by entailment
property essentialism) provides the bridge between knowledge as a natural
kind and premise (5), i.e. themethodological stricture against a priori analy-
sis: because themeaning of natural kind terms is determined by its essential,
actual-world structure, there is no way for our a priori semantic intuitions
properly identies it as H2O. And just as water is a natural kind in every world if it is a
natural kind in this world, knowledge is a natural kind in every world if it is a natural kind
in this world.” For more see (Kornblith 2005).
9 More on this below but see (Kripke 1980), (Putnam 1975, 1983).
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to illuminate the target domain in any informative way.at is, our a priori
application intuitions about knowledge are unreliable in the same way that
our a priori application intuitions about chemical kinds are unreliable: the
target phenomenon is fundamentally empirical and a posteriori.10
us, instead of proceeding from (A)–(C) alone (as it appears prima fa-
cie), there are two further premises in Kornblith’s subargument:
(D) e referential content of natural kind terms is discovered empir-
ically by investigating their locally-determined essence [causal se-
mantics + kind essentialism].
(E) If the referential content of natural kind terms is discovered em-
pirically by investigating their locally-determined essence, then the
referential content of such terms cannot be illuminated by a priori
analysis.
From which Kornblith derives the key premise of the Exclusionary Ar-
gument (hereaer I shall designate (A)–(E) the ‘Natural Kinds’ subargu-
ment):
(5) A priori analysis alone cannot illuminate the natural kind(s) that
stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within its
target domain.
3. Attacking the Exclusionary Argument
With the Natural Kinds subargument supporting premise (5) of Kornblith’s
Exclusionary Argument laid out, I will now contend that we have good rea-
son to reject it. Rejecting this subargument is signicant because premise (5),
as I indicated above, provides key motivation for the methodological sanc-
tion Kornblith advocates.us, undermining the Natural Kinds account of
knowledge will allow me to challenge EA and reject its purported method-
ological upshot.
My objection to the Natural Kinds account of knowledge will employ
two broad lines of argumentation. First (section 4), I will grant Kornblith’s
position and maintain that once we tease out its strongly reductionist con-
sequences, the Natural Kinds account is revealed to be a highly implausible
10 More accurately, Kornblith denies that a priori conceptual analyses can be justied on the
basis of application intuitions. So, he does not deny that we can have application intuitions
about the extension of a concept/predicate F at some scenario e; what he is denying is that
they carry any evidential weight because (following from knowledge as a natural kind)
all justied beliefs about a particular concept F, where F denotes a natural kind, must
ultimately derive from empirical sources.
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theory of knowledge (on grounds of explanatory adequacy). Second (sec-
tion 5), I shi gears somewhat, and argue that Kornblith implicitly relies
upon a priori analysis. is is signicant because it implies that Kornblith
is no more able to justify his own substantive theory of knowledge than his
supposed competitors.
4. Natural Kinds, Reductionism and the Status of Knowledge
e initial line of argumentation I will bring to bear against Kornblith is
broadly abductive in character, and is designed to draw out the highly im-
plausible consequences of his epistemological views. More specically, I will
show that Kornblith’s Natural Kinds account (through its commitment to
essentialism) is a form of reductionism about knowledge, and contend that
such a reductionism with regards to knowledge is theoretically implausible.
is implausibility will, in turn, be drawn out in two separate ways. Af-
ter discussing essentialism and reductionism (4.1), I will put forth two anti-
reductionist arguments adopted from similar debates in the philosophy of
mind.11 First (4.2) I will argue, via multiple realizeability, that Kornblith’s
reductionism severely constrains the potential equivalence-class of knowers
to all and only those entities which share an identical compositional kind;
and furthermore that this theoretical constraint is both arbitrary and most
likely false. Second (4.3), I argue that reductionism about knowledge has the
further undesirable consequence in that it arbitrarily stops us from making
important theoretical generalizations about the epistemic property denoted
by ‘Knowledge’.
4.1 Essentialism and Reductionism
As I argued in the previous section, Kornblith commits himself to the se-
mantics of the causal theory of reference and kind essentialism about nat-
ural kinds in order to support the methodological sanction against a priori
conceptual analysis that he advocates. And although it is intuitive that such a
kind essentialism amounts to a form of reductionism, the link between these
doctrines is generally le implicit in the relevant literature. It is important
for my following objections, however, so let me pause and discuss it.12
A good way to esh out the relationship is to consider the modal status
of primary and secondary nomic properties.13 Contra descriptivism, Kripke
11 By similar debates, I mean similar anti-reductionist (anti type-physicalist) arguments in
the philosophy of mind.
12 For instance, see themain expository works on essentialism especially (Kripke 1980), (Put-
nam 1983) and (Burge 1979).
13 According to this widely held model of natural kinds, the properties characteristic of any
kind K come in two grades, one more fundamental to the other. e more fundamental
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and Putnam purportedly demonstrated that the relation between primary
and secondary properties is noncontingent, via the intuitive plausibility of
the following principle:
(ES) Essentialism about kinds: for any (general) natural kind T , T is in-
dividuated by the same set of essential properties P1, . . . , Pn across
all possible worlds.14
(Where the essential properties individuating T are understood as primary
nomic properties which “realize” or are “responsible for” secondary nomic
properties). As a result, secondary nomic properties are ontologically deriva-
tive from their primary base properties, and thus are simply identied with
them. From this understanding of essentialism, then, it is a short step to
rigidity: true property identities are (a posteriori) necessary, and thus if sec-
ondary properties are identical to primary ones, they are necessarily coex-
tensive (rigid).15
Turning to Kornblith, it is easy to see here why such a property essen-
tialism about natural kinds provides the foundation for a type of semantic
reductionism: if the referential content of ‘knowledge’ is necessarily coex-
tensive (rigid) with the relevant set of physical kind terms—i.e. coextensive
across all possible worlds—then one has reason to think that intension and
extension collapses or deates when it comes to ‘knowledge’ (in the way that
intension and extension collapse for proper names on the non-descriptivist,
Kripkean view) and that it functions as a semantic primitive.16us, reduc-
tionism about ‘knowledge’ can be dened as such:
grade are called primary nomic properties, the less fundamental secondary nomic proper-
ties.e point of the model is that the primary nomic properties ‘underlie’ or ‘give rise’ to
the secondary properties; e.g. we can explain the nomic regularities displayed by the su-
percial properties of gold by invoking its atomic structure.us, this model also implies
a particular ontological relationship between property levels: primary properties are fun-
damental existents and secondary properties simply supervene upon them. See (McGinn
1975).
14 For a similar formulation, see (Bird 2001).
15 More specically, for Water to have a set of secondary properties (clear, potable. . . .) is just
for it to have a particular set of primary properties (say the micro structural composition
H2O). us, Water and H2O are identical (necessarily coextensive) and related rigidly:
there is no possible world in which Water is not H2O and conversely, there is no possible
world in which H2O lacks the secondary properties characteristic of water. See (McGinn
1975, 181). Also, consider the following passage from Kripke’s (1980, 125): “In particular,
then, present scientic theory is such that it is part of the nature of gold as we have it to be
an element with the atomic number 79. (We may also in the same way, then, investigate
further how colour and metallic properties follow from what we have found the substance
gold to be: to the extent that such properties follow from the atomic structure of gold, they
are necessary properties of it, even though they unquestionably are not part of themeaning
of ‘gold’ and were not known with a priori certainty).”
16 Intension and extension collapse in the case of necessary coextensions because in such
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(RK) e natural kind-term ‘knowledge’ is a (directly denoting) seman-
tic primitive which is necessarily coextensive with the same set of
essential physical properties P1, . . . , Pn across all possible worlds.
Summing up this account, the kind knowledge simply is a set of physical
base properties; a set whichwe then identify (via ostension)with the referent
of the natural kind-term ‘Knowledge’ through empirical investigation.
4.2 e Multiple Realizabilty Objection
Understanding how property essentialism is a form of reductionism opens
theway tomy rst criticism ofKornblith’s epistemology. What I will contend
here is the following: given that the natural kinds account of knowledge is
reductionistic, it is vulnerable to an objection based upon the multiple real-
izeability (at the physical level) of epistemic properties.
First, let us review. If I am correct in explicating his position, Korn-
blith is committed to a metaphysical essentialism such that knowledge, as a
natural kind, is identical to the physical kind which realizes it. Turning to
the semantic side, Kornblith uses this putative kind identity to underpin a
reductionism about epistemic kind-terms such that higher-order (i.e. func-
tional) epistemic predicates, construed in an intentional, mentalistic vocab-
ulary,17 are necessarily coextensional with lower-order physical predicates.
And it is this semantic-metaphysical move, I emphasize, which provides the
foundation for Kornblith’s methodological sanction on the a priori.18 As a
result, if it could be determined that the kind identity in question is false,
cases we cannot prize apart descriptive and referential content. at is, if ‘knowledge’ =
‘physical property p’, then there is no possible world W where the descriptive content of
‘knowledge’ is associated with an alternative extension precisely because this descriptive
content just is (ontologically) its referent. In otherwords, the constituent of the proposition
“knowledge’ = ‘physical property p” is simply the physical object which necessarily “gives
rise” (for reasons explained in a footnote above) to the secondary nomic properties which
are associated with ‘knowledge’.us, it is clear that the deationary, anti-descriptivist se-
mantics underpinning Kornblith’s reductionism about knowledge relies upon prior onto-
logical property identications. For more, see (McGinn 1975), (Boyd 1988), (Kripke 1980).
17 By ‘mentalistic’, I mean that epistemic predicates are couched in the vocabulary of what is
known as “folk” (belief/desire) psychology.at (unreduced) epistemological vocabulary
is mentalistic is a relatively uncontroversial point, and I shall not belabour it presently. For
more, however, see (Tye 1992), (Block 1997).
18 As I made clear in the previous section; Kornblith’s methodological sanction on a priori
methodology turns on his argument to the eect that knowledge (and other epistemolog-
ical kinds) are discovered a posteriori; implying that none of our putative a priori beliefs
about the phenomenon are justied. And knowledge as an a posteriori phenomenon, for
reasons discussed elsewhere, requires property essentialism and the associated semantic
machinery.us, the overall structure of Kornblith’s negative argument stands or falls on
the soundness of his natural kinds argument for property essentialism about knowledge.
14 Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism
then justication for skepticism about the a priori would be undermined,
the semantics of knowledge as an a posteriori natural kind requiring this
property identity.19
I argue that the multiple realizeability objection gives us excellent rea-
son to believe that this kind identity is in fact false. e objection runs as
follows. For reductionism to be true, the kind-term ‘knowledge’ must be
necessarily coextensional with a particular physical kind-term ‘P’; which in
turn requires a true property identity between the kind denoted by ‘knowl-
edge’ and its physical realizer P. But the kind denoted by ‘knowledge’ is
compatible with multiple base properties (P, Q, R, . . . , n); implying that it
cannot be identical with P. So ‘knowledge’ is not necessarily coextensional
with ‘P’, and thus Kornblith’s reductionism about knowledge is false; it is not
a structured natural kind with an individuating essence like gold or water.
Construed in abbreviated form:
(1) [e multiple realizeability thesis] Epistemic property-kinds such
as knowledge are multiply realizable.
(2) [e anti-identity thesis] If epistemic kinds such as knowledge are
multiply realizable, then they are not identical to only one set of
physical kinds.
(3) erefore, if epistemic kinds such as knowledge are not identical to
physical kinds, then epistemic kind-terms are not necessarily coex-
tensional with physical kind-terms.20
To expand upon this rather general formulation, I want to look at two
dierent variations of the argument, one providing empirical motivation for
the conclusion drawn, the other providing conceptual motivation.e em-
pirical variant is derived from an argument made by Hilary Putnam (1967),
and the conceptual variant is derived from an argumentmade by Jerry Fodor
(1974, 97–115).
4.2.1 Putnam’s Argument
Putnam objects to reductionism about mental properties empirically, by cit-
ing evidence regarding neurophysiological variety in higher organisms. For
the fact that dierent species of higher organisms display highly variegated
physical neurological structures, Putnam argues, coupled with the strong
19 As per my discussion on the previous section, ontologically signicant reduction requires
the reduction of higher-level properties and this in turn requires that they be identied
with (complexes of) lower-level properties. Identity, of course, requires (at minimum) an
appropriately modalized coextensivity. See (Kim 1992).
20 For a similar argument, see (Bickle 2013). Also see (Horgan 1993).
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likelihood that they instantiate functionally indistinguishable mental prop-
erties (such as pain) implies that reductionism is empirically false. Described
in Putnam’s own words:
Considerwhat the brain-state theorist [reductionist] has to do tomake
good his claims. He has to specify a physical-chemical state such
that any organism (not just mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it
possesses a brain of suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its
brain is in that physical-chemical state.is means that the physical-
chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian
brain, a reptilian brain, amollusc’s brain (octopuses aremolluscs, and
certainly feel pain), etc. (Putnam 1967, 436)
If every psychological property is, according to reductionism, necessar-
ily identical to some underlying physical-chemical property, then the antire-
ductionist only needs to nd one psychological property that is applicable to
all of these creatures but whose realizing physiological base properties dif-
fer. And according to Putnam, (given neurobiological structural diversity)
it is “overwhelmingly likely” (Putnam 1967, 437)21 that such a psychological
property can be found, thus implying (by induction) the falsity of reduction-
ism.
Importantly, I think that an analogous version of Putnam’s empirically
motivated multiple realizeability argument is quite eective against Korn-
blith’s reductionismabout knowledge.is is for the following reason. Given
the very plausible assumption that epistemic states just are species of psy-
chological states, it seems overwhelmingly likely that the wide variety of or-
ganisms which realize epistemic informational states of the kind Kornblith
countenances in fact do so via diverse neurophysiological base properties.
For example, consider the higher-order (i.e. functional) state associatedwith
the epistemic kind justied. It seems empirically likely that a wide variety of
(actual and possible) organisms, endowed with very dierent physical cog-
nitive architecture to our own, could instantiate the functional state associ-
ated with this epistemic kind. And if this is the case, it follows that epistemic
kinds such as knowledge and justication are multiply realizable, with the
further implication that Kornblith’s claim of a theoretical identity between
epistemic and physical kinds (and hence the claim of a necessary coexten-
sion between kind-terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘P’) is false.
4.2.2 Fodor’s Argument
e second variant of the multiple realizeability argument was originally ar-
ticulated by Fodor. He claims thatwe have reasons, independent of empirical
ndings, to reject reductionism.
21 See also (Bickle 1998, 116–117).
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e argument begins with the following observation: if reductionism is
true, then it follows that the lawlike regularities which can be captured by
higher level psychological kind-terms (the focus of the “special sciences”)
can be redescribed or mapped one-one salva veritate (given proper bridge
laws) into lawlike regularities of a lower level reducing set of physical kind-
terms.at is, according to reductionism, coextensive kind identity implies
that every event which falls under a law of psychology also falls under a law
of physics:22
If reductionism is true, then every kind is, or is coextensive with,
a physical kind. . . this follows immediately from the reductionist
premise that every predicate which appears as the antecedent or con-
sequent of a law of a special sciencemust appear as one of the reduced
predicates in some bridge law, together with the assumption that the
kind predicates are the ones whose terms are the bound variables in
proper laws. (Fodor 1974, 132–133)
e problem, argues Fodor, is that the possibility of multiple realization23
precludes the subsumption of higher level psychological laws to lower level
physical laws. Why? Because if a particular psychological kind can be real-
ized bymultiple base kinds, then one-one mappings of kind-terms (theoret-
ical coextension) will not be possible. At best, “wildly disjunctive” laws will
obtain; laws such as:
(L1) (K ↔ (P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3 ∨ P4 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn))
However, (and this is the key point), the disjunctive consequent of L1
is not a kind predicate (i.e. does not range over a distinct entity), and the
entire expression is not a law of any current physical science; implying that
reductionism about psychological kinds is untenable.
To understand the full upshot of this argument, it is necessary to under-
stand why Fodor prohibits the reduction of psychological laws to an open-
ended disjunctive set of lower-level physical laws.e primary reason, it ap-
pears, has to do with nomic projectability.24e idea here, I think, is that we
22is is because higher-level kind-terms, given necessary coextension, express a bicondi-
tional relation with lower-level physical kind-terms suck that K ↔ P. us, they can be
intersubsituted while preserving truth-value. is is how “classical” reductionist theories
were oen construed. For more, see (Nagel 1961).
23 Here Fodor (1974) cites neuroplasticity data taken from the work of Karl Lashley. Also see
(Fodor 1975).
24at is, projectability, according to Kim (1992, 11): “. . . is the ability to be conrmed by ob-
servation of positive instances such that any generalized conditional of the for “all F’s are
G” can be conrmed by the exhaustion of the class of F’s—that is, by eliminating all poten-
tial falsiers. . .Lawlike generalizations, however, are thought to have the following further
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cannot reduce a higher level psychological kind to a set of disjunctive physi-
cal properties because such disjunctive sets fail to pass the projectability test,
suggesting that they fail to range over an actual lawlike kind through which
explanatorily adequate generalizations about the reducing domain could be
secured (i.e. they are “gerrymandered” kinds).25us, contends Fodor, psy-
chological kinds, as extensionally equivalent to an indenite variety of base
properties (i.e. they are “cross-classifying”), maintain an explanatory auton-
omy vis-à-vis their lower level physiological correlates; an autonomy which
establishes the falsity of reductionism.26
As in the previous section, I believe that we can run a parallel variant of
the argument against Kornblith’s reductionism about knowledge. e rea-
son is simple: given the plausible assumption that propositional attitudes
about epistemicmatters just are a type or subclass of higher-level psycholog-
ical (intentional/doxastic) kinds,27 we have as much reason (at least short of
an argument establishing the relevant disanalogy) to believe that the former
are going to be (in the words of Fodor) as “wildly disjunctive” as the latter.
at is, it seems justied to think that if epistemic states are, (like other psy-
chological states), compatible with an open-ended number of base realizers,
then they will fail, on conceptual grounds, to correspond to or range over
an actual natural kind through which explanatorily adequate (projectable)
reductive generalizations about the epistemic domain can be secured. For
instance, let us consider the epistemic propositional attitude ‘justied belief ’.
If Fodor is correct and psychological kinds correlate with a disjunctive set
property: observation of positive instances, F’s that areG’s, can strengthen our credence in
the next F being aG. It is this kind of instance-to-instance accretion of conrmation that is
supposed to be the hallmark of lawlikeness; it is what explains the possibility of conrming
a generalization about an indenitely large class of items on the basis of a nite number of
favorable observations.”
25 Here is how Kim (1992, 10) puts the point: “. . . if M is identied with non-kind Q (or M is
reduced via a biconditional bridge principle “M ↔ Q”, where Q is a non-kind), M could
no longer gure in special science laws; e.g. the law “M → R” would in eect reduce to
“Q → R“, and therefore loses its status as a law on account of containing Q, a non-kind.
So, in the epistemic case, reduction of the property ‘knowledge‘ to a disjunction of physical
properties would imply that we would no longer be able to accurately generalize over the
property, because it would not support robust counterfactual explanation. For more, see
(Goodman 1983).
26us Fodor (1974, 13): “ere are special sciences [viz. psychology] . . . because of the way
the world is put together: not all kinds (not all the classes of things and events about which
there are important, counterfactual supporting generalizations tomake) are, or correspond
to, physical kinds.” We could, perhaps, simply go eliminativist about psychological prop-
erties in the face of this argument. But this is an implausible option with little relevance to
my current topic; so I will not dwell on it.
27 I take it that this is not a controversial point: what, other than token intentional states,
could epistemic states be?
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of base realizers, then it is quite clear that any attempt to reduce or explain
away ‘justied belief ’ in such a manner is going to eliminate the projectabil-
ity of the original epistemic generalization. Why? Because in such a case,
instead of having a functionally specied state which would support gen-
eral inferential predictions, we would instead be le with a set of disparate
physical kinds over which no projections could be made (due to physical
dissimilarity). Like other theoretical kinds embedded in proportional atti-
tudes, epistemic kinds are functionally realized, and thus resist reduction.
4.3 e Argument from Psychological Explanation
e second anti-reductionist argument I would like to make is rooted in
some remarks made by the psychologist Zenon Pylyshyn (1984). Pylyshyn
defends the indispensability of a higher order cognitive (or intentional) vo-
cabulary to the discipline of psychology by arguing that a reductionistic ac-
count of human action is unable to capture theoretically indispensable gen-
eralizations.
It is generally agreed upon that one of the primary tasks of science is to
capture lawlike generalizations in nature as a means of supporting inductive
inference over a particular domain; where the generalizations in question
are relative to a particular set of entities and a particular theoretical vocabu-
lary. What Pylyshynmaintains is that even if psychological terms were, in all
cases, extensionally equivalent to a set of physical terms, we could not reduce
or deate the vocabulary of psychological laws to the vocabulary of physi-
cal/biological laws. Since the upshot of his objection turns on an example,
let me summarize it.
4.3.1 Folk Psychology and Explanatory Power
Take a commonplace occurrence such as a pedestrian witnessing a car ac-
cident. Seeing that people are hurt, the pedestrian runs to the phone booth
and dials a ‘9’, followed by a ‘1’. What will she do next? And why did she run
to the phone booth? As John Bickle articulates:
When one recognizes that an emergency has occurred, one typically
wants to communicate that information to thosewho canhelp the vic-
tims. One way to communicate such information eciently is to use
the emergency telephone number. Most adults in our culture know
that the emergency telephone number is 911. So when a person knows
that he has successfully dialed 9 and 1 in this situation, [it is clear that]
he will intend to dial another 1. When it comes to telephone dialing,
people tend to dial the number they intend to dial. e connection
between the perceived situation and the action is systematic. ere is
a generalization between perceived situation and action here for the
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capturing, and this generalization extends beyond merely this situa-
tion to the equivalence class of all situations involving collections of
beliefs and desires whose contents are similarly related. (Bickle 1998,
152)
It is no coincidence that we can accurately predict that the person in
question will intentionally dial another ‘1’ in this scenario. For we recognize
this sequence as a particular instance of a general folk psychological gener-
alization which counterfactually obtains between a desired state of aairs D
(viz. to help, to phone 911, etc.) and a consequent action-type A intended to
bring about D (viz. going to the phone booth, picking up the phone, dialling a
1); where this psychological generalization ranges over all equivalent situa-
tions in which an agent desires a particular state of aairs, and believes that
intending a particular action-type will bring about this state of aairs.at
is:
(G) (∀S) (∀D) (∀A) (If S wants D and believes that doing A will bring
about D, then ceteris paribus S will do A).28
Both the scenario in question and generalization (G) are obvious to us be-
cause we grasp the psychology of belief-desire intentional states: we know
that when one desires a particular end, and knowwhat action-typewill bring
it about, one will generally perform this action-type.
Now to the actual objection. Pylyshyn argues that we cannot capture im-
portant folk psychological generalizations such as (G) in a lower level neuro-
physiological or biological vocabulary.at is, when the predicates of a par-
ticular psychological generalization are reduced to the predicates of a par-
ticular neurophysiological or biological vocabulary, the generalizations cap-
tured under higher level psychological description disappear. is is because
of the “projectability problem”: under the assumption that any particular
psychological predicate is correlated with an open-ended number of phys-
ical realizers (i.e. the predicates “cross-classify”), closed (non-disjunctive)
ceteris paribus psychological generalizations (in this case, what is expressed
by (G) above) cease to be projectable when reduced to the neurophysiolog-
ical level. us, and this is Pylyshyn’s key thesis, important generalizations
couched in the former vocabulary such as (G) are simply missed or elimi-
nated when the descriptive predicates of intentional psychology are recast
in the vocabulary of neurophysiology:
e neurophysiological story misses the most important psycholog-
ical generalization involved: regardless of how a person learns the
28 See (Horgan 1993, 298).
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emergency number, regardless of how she comes to perceive the sit-
uation as an emergency, and regardless of how the person’s limbs
are moved in dialing, a single, general principle is implicit in the. . .
sequence. (Pylyshyn 1984, 11)
Hence, only if we retain the higher-level intentional vocabulary of folk
psychology can physically unrelated processes be organized into a (belief-
desire-action) equivalence class over which robust (projectable) counterfac-
tual generalizations be fashioned, for two levels of explanation can exten-
sionally converge without providing equal predictive capacities (because of
dierences in intensional content).
As an aside, note that the argument from Psychological Explanation, al-
though invoking the premise of multiple base realizers is, I believe, dialec-
tically distinct from the multiple realizeability objection for the following
reason. Even if it was unproblematically possible, metaphysically speaking,
to identify psychological predicates with a set of disjunctive realizers, this
would not, at least on the face of it, settle the epistemological question of
explanatory ecacy or relevance. at is, Pylyshyn’s argument for the in-
dispensability of higher level folk psychological explanation seems to hold
weight even if at some level an ontological reduction was possible.
So, the argument concludes, a reductionism about psychological pred-
icates violates one of the primary tenants of scientic inquiry: capture all
capturable generalizations. When folk psychology is deated, signicant
counterfactual regularities are missed. And as a result, we have very good
inductive grounds for rejecting reductionism (as ameans of maximizing the
predictive capacities of theory).
4.3.2 Applying the Argument to Kornblith
I believe that Pylyshyn’s objection to reductionism can be wielded against
Kornblith’s particular brand of epistemological reductionism. More specif-
ically, I will contend below that one upshot of the argument from psycho-
logical explanation is that it puts Kornblith face to face with a constructive
dilemma: either (I) maintain reductionism, the consequence being the pro-
jectability problem, or (as a means of avoiding the projectability problem)
reject reductionism (II) therein undermining motivation for the method-
ological sanction on the a priori.is dilemma, I will argue, renders Korn-
blith’s natural kinds account of knowledge highly implausible.
4.3.3 e First Horn
First, note that many generalizations captured by the vocabulary of inten-
tional psychology express propositional attitudes that are explicitly episte-
mological. at is, doxastic intentional states like believes, knows and has
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evidence for express an epistemic relation between a propositional attitude
and a putative state of aairs; an intentional relationship which is suciently
robust to support ceteris paribus psychological generalizations. Here is an
example of such a generalization involving the propositional attitude ‘has
evidence for’:29
(EG) (∀S) (∀E) (∀B) (If a subject S has evidence E for her belief B, then
S will be disposed, ceterus paribus, to arm B when prompted).
Second, recall the basic import of Kornblith’s reductionism: for any epis-
temological predicate P expressed in a (higher level) psychological vocabu-
lary, P is necessarily coextensional with a (lower level) predicateQ expressed
in a physical vocabulary.30 So, when we turn to a higher level ceterus paribus
generalization like (EG), it appears that Kornblith would be committed to a
position such that necessarily, for each higher level psychological term of the
generalization (EG), there is a lower level physical term such that the latter
is necessarily coextensive with the former.31
If I am correct here, then it is easy to see how Pylyshyn’s objection can be
brought to bear on Kornblith. For if epistemological predicates expressed in
a psychological vocabulary reduce to lower order physical predicates (which
follows from essentialism), and we assume the very plausible premise of
open-ended base realizers, then the “projectability problem” arises for Ko-
rnblith. More specically, if the terms of a generalization like (EG) are corre-
lated with multiple physical realizers, then (as Pylyshyn demonstrates with
an unspecied psychophysical reductionism) the generalization in question
simply disappears when reduced to the physical level; at least insofar as its
conjunctive physical correlates do not support projectable counterfactuals.
is is a signicant problem for Kornblith’s natural kinds account. For if
the reductive view of epistemic properties cannot capture higher level gen-
eralizations such as (EG), then it lacks explanatory power vis-à-vis its initial
target explanandum and thus appears to be self-defeating.
4.3.4 e Second Horn
Can Kornblith’s account of knowledge successfully avoid the projectability
problem if modied? I argue that it cannot do so without usurping motiva-
tion for the prohibition on a priori analysis. is becomes clear when the
following two points are emphasized.
29 For more on epistemic states as propositional attitudes, see (Horgan 1993).
30 Where ‘coextension’ is understood in ontological terms as per section 2.3.1.1; i.e. P is neces-
sarily (de re) coextensional with Q according to Kornblith because Q denotes a set of pri-
mary nomic properties which are “constitutive of ” and “give rise” to the secondary nomic
properties denoted by P.
31 See (Bickle 1998, 152) and (Kim 1992), (Horgan 1993).
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First, as I made clear above, recall that the essentialist strategy for pro-
hibiting the a priori is at the root of the projectability problem. is point
becomes apparent when it is understood that reduction of higher level epis-
temic terms to lower level physical terms requires that the kinds denoted by
each sort of term are identical (i.e. a relation of necessary coextensivity).32
Second, recall that adopting property essentialism alsounderlies premise
(D) of the Natural Kinds subargument:
(D) e referential content of natural kind terms is discovered empiri-
cally by investigating their locally-determined essence [assumption
via causal semantics + kind essentialism].
e stipulation of essentialism in (D) makes it the crucial premise in the
subargument for the following reason. In identifying epistemological kinds
with unique physical kinds, premise (D) provides themetaphysical underpin-
ning for the semantics of the causal theory of reference.33 And it is adopting
a causal theory of reference which justies Kornblith’s argument to the eect
that the business of understanding the semantic content of the term ‘knowl-
edge’ is an entirely a posteriori aair.
Crucially, then, when these two points are combined, we can see that if
Kornblith were to try and circumvent the projectability problem by modi-
fying premise (D) (by adopting an alternate theory of reference), he would
be unable to maintain his proscription against a priori analysis. Why? Be-
cause if I am correct, justication for Kornblith’s Exclusionary Argument
would fall away without justicatory support of the essentialist thesis (and
the causal theory of reference as its semantic analogue). More specically,
only through the essentialist thesis in question can Kornblith repudiate a
functional (higher order) view of epistemic properties; and such repudia-
tion is necessary for the Exclusionary Argument to have any traction what-
soever.34 us, modifying the relevant premise of the Natural Kinds sub-
argument in the face of the projectability problem does not seem like a live
option for Kornblith, lest he was to abandon his overall metaepistemological
aims.
32 See footnotes 12–14 above.
33 More specically, it is generally acknowledged that the semantics of the causal theory of
reference, in order to deate descriptive to referential content (in the “Millian” sense), re-
lies upon an assumed (metaphysical) essentialist premise to the eect that the secondary
properties S of some natural kind K are identical to a set of primary properties P which
constitute or “give rise to” S. For more details, see footnote 14 above and (Putnam 1975).
34is is, roughly, for the following reason. Because functional properties are identied by
their descriptive content, they are thus amenable to a priori conceptual analysis (that is,
we can know, a priori, whether a possible world contains a particular functional kind by
simply examining the meaning of the relevant terms and intensions).
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4.3.5 e Constructive Dilemma
If my arguments presented in (I) and (II) above are sound, then Kornblith
is placed in an awkward dialectical position. While the projectability prob-
lem poses severe problems for a reduction of epistemic properties to physi-
cal correlates, it appears that the reductive component (i.e. premise (D)) of
Kornblith’s Natural Kinds subargument cannot be modied without under-
mining justication for the key premise of his Exclusionary Argument.
us, we can run the following constructive dilemma against the natural
kinds account of knowledge:
(1) If Kornblith retains essentialism about natural kinds, then his ac-
count will fail to capture important epistemological generalizations
[from (I)].
(2) If Kornblith rejects essentialism about natural kinds, then his ac-
count will fail to provide justication for his proscription on a priori
analysis [from (II)].
(3) Either Kornblith retains essentialism or drops essentialism.
(4) erefore, either his account will fail to capture important episte-
mological generalizations, or it will fail to provide warrant for a
sanction on a priori analysis.
is line of reasoning, I think, gives us a good case for rejecting Korn-
blith’s subargument for essentialism, and thus rejecting the exclusionary ar-
gument against a priori justication which it supports. For my constructive
dilemma provides good reason for rejecting (D) of the subargument, and
hence leaves us with no good reason to accept premise (5) of the exclusionary
argument. In particular, it leaves us with no good reason to accept premise
(5)’s presupposition that ‘knowledge’ (or other epistemic kind terms such
as ‘justication’, etc.) denotes a natural kind. (More specically, Premise (5)
says: “Apriori analysis cannot illuminate the natural kind(s) that stand as the
referential content of the term(s) contained within its target domain.”is is
equivalent to: “(a)e referential content of the term contained within the
target domain of a priori analysis is a natural kind, and (b) a priori analysis
cannot illuminate this referential content.” I reject (a) here, but not (b). And
the point is that, given the soundness of my constructive dilemma, we can
now see that Kornblith has no good reason to prevent us from rejecting (5)
overall by rejecting the (a) bit of it).35
35 anks to David Matheson for suggestions here.
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So, whetherKornblith embraces one horn or the other, hisNatural Kinds
subargument appears to be undermined. Andwith this subargument under-
mined, the core Exclusionary Argument loses its force.
5. e “Starting Points” Objection36
My nal criticism of Kornblith presents a further problem for the natural
kinds account of knowledge. More specically, I will argue the following.
Because the kind knowledge (unlike paradigmatic natural kinds like gold or
water) lacks observable properties, Kornblith is forced to rely upon a priori
application intuitions in order to identify cases of it. However, because his
Empirical Method commits him to holding such application intuitions un-
reliable, we have no reason to believe that he has successfully illuminated
his target explanandum. us, assuming for the sake of argument that the
proper targets of inquiry are natural kinds, Kornblith‘s account of knowl-
edge is open to the very same objections as his “armchair” rivals; implying a
form of epistemological scepticism.
5.1 Kornblith, Conceptual Analysis and the Empirical Strategy
In order to set up the objection, we need to briey review both Kornblith’s
rejection of a priori conceptual analysis vis-à-vis epistemological kinds and
the empirical method he puts in its place. e root of Kornblith’s rejection
follows from his view of epistemological inquiry as directed at extramental
natural kinds. More specically, he denies that conceptual analysis can be
justied on the basis of application intuition (Kornblith 2002, 10–11).
Given the nature of the target phenomenon, then, the way in which epis-
temological methodology must proceed, according to Kornblith, resembles
the methodology used to study other extramental natural kinds (like geo-
logical kinds):
When we appeal to our intuitions about knowledge, we make salient
certain instances of the phenomenon that need to be accounted for,
and that these are genuine instances of knowledge is simply obvious,
at least if our examples are well chosen. What we are doing, as I see
it, is much like the rock collector who gathers samples of some in-
teresting kind of stone for the purpose of guring out what it is that
the samples have in common. We begin, oen enough, with obvious
cases, even if we do not yet understand what it is that provides the
theoretical unity to the kind we wish to examine. (Kornblith 2002,
10–11)
36e title of this objection was chosen in homage to George Bealer (1996), who makes a
similar argument in opposition to Quinean empiricism.
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How are we to single out natural kinds, if not by conceptual analysis? Here
Kornblith appeals to the causal theory of reference: we “point to” a salient
empirical sample of the relevant phenomenon, and then ostensivley “bap-
tize” it with a general kind term. We then proceed to scientically investigate
the identied kind, in order to discover its essential nomic properties.at
is, we use the following two stage strategy for picking out natural kinds:
e Empirical Strategy (ES):
(1) e Initial Designation: A commonplace sample is ostensively bap-
tized with a natural kind term K
(2) Empirical Discovery: Investigation reveals what essential physical
properties O unites all samples of kind K.37
Importantly, Kornblith argues that our a priori application intuitions do
not provide any real bearing on (ES) because they have no way of illumi-
nating the deep physical structures unifying natural kinds Only when we
begin to empirically examine “samples” do we gain insight into the unifying
properties underlying the kindhood of the phenomena in question.
5.2 e Disanalogy Premise and Knowledge
Kornblith claims that we can ostensively “pick out” samples of our target
natural kind and then proceed to investigate it empirically. I argue here that
(i) it is doubtful that knowledge can be picked out by ostension in a way
analogous to paradigmatic natural kinds like water or gold. Furthermore,
(ii), I argue that this disanalogy has signicant repercussions for his actual
method of identifying putative cases of knowledge contra (ES).
5.2.1 e Disanalogy Premise
Let us return to the “Initial Designation” stage of Kornblith’s (ES). While it
seems well suited for discovering samples of rocks, water or gold, it seems
less than well suited to the investigation of knowledge. For how could we
nd and designate a “commonplace sample” of knowledge? Where in nature
would we look? Is knowledge a collection of cells? A bundle of C-bres?
A genus of organism?38 us, on further examination Kornblith’s analogy
to the rock collector highlighted above breaks down into a disanalogy—for
even if we ignore the considerable issue of theory-ladenness in observability
37is is not a commitment rendered explicit by Kornblith, but it is implicit within his dis-
cussion. See (Kornblith 2002, chapters 1–2).
38 Note that this problem of identication is orthogonal to what Devitt calls the “Qua Prob-
lem” for causal theories of reference. See (Devitt 1981).
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(which the Initial Designation stage seems to ignore),39 it does not seem as
if we could ostensivley “point to” knowledge:
(DP) e Disanalogy Premise: In contrast to water, or gold, knowledge
does not have observable properties which we could ostensivley
“point to” or “pick out”.
e reason for the disanalogy seems clear: unlike water or gold, knowl-
edge lacks an empirical “mode of presentation” through which we could as-
sociate a kind term with an extensional reference class via an initial bap-
tismal act. In other words, we cannot just look into the world, point and say
“at such-and-such x shall be designated with the kind term ‘Knowledge”’.
5.2.2 Fixing the Reference of Knowledge
Assuming that the Disanalogy Premise is correct, Kornblith cannot simply
“point to” and ostensivley designate commonplace samples of knowledge.
However, it is important to note that he does, in fact, succeed in individuat-
ing a reference class for the relevant term. For consider here a basic descrip-
tion of Kornblith’s reliabilist account of knowledge:
(K) Knowledge: A reliably produced informational state or belief (rela-
tive to a particular external environment).40
e relevant question thus becomes: how could Kornblith justify an identi-
cation of knowledge with reliably produced belief, if he cannot do so, given
the relevant disanalogy outlined above, by causal/ostensive means?
I argue that Kornblith’s justication for this identication implicitly pro-
ceeds bymeans of a priori analysis with its reliance on application intuitions,
and indeed, I believe, must proceed in this manner. e reason (roughly
stated) is this: because the complex property denoted by the description
‘reliably produced belief ’ is functional rather than physical,41 the only pos-
sible way Kornblith could secure the property identity in question would
be through an a priori assessment of the intensional content of the concept
39 As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, Kornblith’s ES implicitly assumes a naive
empiricism about observable properties. And while I agree that theory-ladenness causes
considerable problems for this assumption, I think the argument is stronger as it stands,
without relying on considerations of theory-ladenness. For we can see the Disanalogy
Premise as claiming that, even if we ignore the substantial problems theory-ladeness poses
to his natural kinds view (i.e. even if we grant naive empiricism), Kornblith’s anthology still
breaks down because ‘Knowledge’ does not have any observational properties that could
even be theory-laden to begin with.
40 See (Kornblith 2002, 63–69).
41 Knowledge is functional because, roughly, it denotes via or through a descriptive set of
causal powers which do not reduce to a set of structured (i.e. microphysical) properties.
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knowledge (vis-à-vis a set of hypothetical scenarios).42us, despite his ex-
plicit endorsement of ES, Kornblith cannot in practice actually rely upon
a causal, a posteriori account of epistemic properties in order to justify his
theory of knowledge; this being impossible given the particular manner in
which the reference of the term ‘knowledge’ must be secured.
5.3 Extramental Kinds, Starting Points and Relevancy
If Kornblith does in fact implicitly rely upon a priori analysis in order to jus-
tify his theory of knowledge, this is a very signicant nding. For in what
follows I argue that such a methodological reliance is at odds with his meta-
physical commitments to extramental natural kinds.
Recall that Kornblith considers the target of epistemological inquiry to
be an extramental natural kind, a kind which displays projectable homeo-
static regularities. So far, so good. But now the problem: if Kornblith holds
that knowledge has an extramental essence, yet (implicitly) relies upon a pri-
ori analysis in order to initially determine the content of the concept ‘Knowl-
edge’, then we have no reason to think that his account of the phenomena will
closely correspond to its extramental essence. Why? Because if knowledge
is really an extramental phenomenon (which is, I note, a thesis which Ko-
rnblith explicitly endorses) then we do not have any reason to think that
somehow, a priori, he is zeroing in on or referring to the correct extramental
properties. In short: our concepts canmisrepresent the world.is point can
be further cashed out by keeping inmind the disanalogy between knowledge
and paradigmatic natural kinds like gold or heat. As Bryson and Alexander
put it:
Note the contrast between gathering samples of water or heat and
gathering samples of knowledge. Our intuitions tend to be far less
uniform in the epistemic realm.is is probably because we identify
water and heat through observable properties. ey have a certain
group of properties that uniformly inuence our classicatory judge-
ments. (Bryson and Alexander 2012, 15)
Becausewe can identify the latter kinds via observational properties, zeroing
in on the correct explanandum is both relatively straightforward and uncon-
troversial. But this is not at all the case with knowledge: we must rely upon
42e process for arriving at such an account of ‘Knowledge’ would go as follows. First,
we would analyze the intuitive application (extension) of our concept of knowledge in a
hypothetical scenario containing reliable informational states.is would provide the evi-
dential input for an a priori function which would generate as output a prima facie justied
belief about the intensional content of our implicit concept of knowledge. Only if we in-
tuited that all and only those scenarios where reliable informational states are instantiated
were scenarios where knowledge is instantiated would we have a priori evidence for a jus-
tied belief regarding the coextension of the relevant predicates.
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our intuitions about possible cases in order to determine the content of the
relevant concept; intuitions which are both highly contested and controver-
sial.
With this, the pieces are nally in place for my Starting Points objection,
which proceeds as follows. As we have seen, Kornblith relies upon a priori
analysis to justify his reliabilst account of knowledge. However (assuming
that the proper targets of epistemic inquiry are extramental natural kinds)
the Empirical Strategy commits him to holding that a priori intuitions are
totally unreliable vis-à-vis the target explanandum. us, Kornblith is not
justied in holding that his preferred account of knowledge (as reliably pro-
duced true belief) successfully picks out or corresponds to a natural kind. In
other words (as a result of the disanalogy premise), Kornblith, like his pri-
mary rivals, is forced to rely upon a methodological starting point which is
fundamentally ill-suited to the illumination of an empirical target phenom-
ena. So (and this is the crucial point) it does not seem that he—or anyone
else for that matter—will be able to successfully illuminate the target phe-
nomenon. Summarized,e Starting Points Objection is this:
(1) As per theDP, Kornblithmust rely upon a priori conceptual analysis
in order to justify his account of knowledge as reliably produced
belief.
(2) However, Kornblith’s ES commits him to the unreliability of a priori
intuitions vis-à-vis the target explanandum (because concepts can
misrepresent a natural kind).
(3) erefore, Kornblith can be no more justied in holding that his
preferred account of knowledge, rather than those of his armchair
opponents, successfully picks out or tracks an extramental natural
kind (or has any relevance to an extramental domain of inquiry).
If this argument is sound, Kornblith’s actual method (as opposed to his
ocial one) is open to the very same objections he makes against those
who explicitly advocate an armchair approach. For despite the emphasis
Kornblith places upon ES, he advocates an analysis of knowledge which,
rather than being causal/ostensive, proceeds a priori. As a result, Kornblith’s
methodological sanction against the a priori serves to defeat his own reli-
abilist theory in the same manner that it purports to defeat his armchair
rivals; for if knowledge is in fact a natural kind, then we have no reason to
think that his armchair reliabilism picks out the correct properties a priori.
In fact, I think that the argument has an even stronger upshot, which is as
follows: if the Disanalogy Premise is true, and we cannot pick out instances
of knowledge by empirical means, then it follows that any proposed analysis
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of knowledge will be defeated (i.e. ruled out as unjustied) by ES, because
the latter methodology permits all and only those analyses which make em-
pirical (i.e. causal/ostensive) identities.
us, for the reasons given above, if the Starting Points argument is on
the mark, Kornblith’s Empirical Strategy is tantamount to a form of scep-
ticism regarding epistemic property ascriptions. Moreover, given that the
adoption of such a sceptical metaepistemology would have highly implau-
sible consequences for the practise of normative epistemology (which un-
fortunately I do not have space to elaborate upon here),43 I believe that we
therefore have good reason to reject the ES outright.
6. Conclusion
As ameans to concluding this paper, let me rst summarize the general out-
line of Kornblith’s empiricalmetaepistemology, and second, review the three
arguments I have articulated in objection to it, and comment on the poten-
tial implications. My hope is that this summary will bring the dialectical
import of the discussion into sharper focus in support of my overall aims.
6.1 Summary of Kornblith’s Argument
In the broadest terms, Kornblith’s primary aim is to argue that a thoroughly
naturalized metaepistemology must reject a priori methods outright (or, to
put it in terms of the schema introduced in the rst section, Kornblith argues
in favour of an armation of (i) and denial of both (ii)–(iii)).e basis for
this methodological exclusion of the a priori, furthermore, is based upon his
particular view of knowledge as an extramental natural kind; it is an a poste-
riori, empirical phenomenon which therefore is not amenable to conceptual
analysis.
Here is the so-called “Exclusionary Argument” summarized:
(1) If epistemology is to bemethodologically naturalized in a thorough-
going manner, then it cannot retain scientically suspect methods.
(2) Epistemology is to be methodologically naturalized in a thorough-
going manner.
(3) erefore, epistemology cannot retain scientically suspect meth-
ods.
(4) If an epistemological method cannot illuminate the natural kind(s)
that stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within
its target domain, then it is a scientically suspect method.
43 For more on this, see (Cuneo 2007) and (Lynch 2009).
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(5) A priori analysis alone cannot illuminate the natural kind(s) that
stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within its
target domain.
(6) erefore, a priori analysis is a scientically suspect method. (7)
erefore, epistemology cannot retain a priori analysis.
As I made clear above, the lynchpin premise is (5), which, in presupposing
that knowledge is an extramental natural kind, sets up the desired method-
ological sanction expressed by (6) and (7).us, Kornblith attempts to shore
up this key premise by defending the thesis of knowledge as a natural kind,
which I subsequently reconstructed as the following “Natural Kinds” subar-
gument:
(A) If a term denotes a co-occurring set of properties which: (i) con-
stitute a “Homeostatic Cluster”, (ii) this set is “projectable”; i.e. it
persists through external change and gures centrally in causal/no-
mological explanations, then this term denotes a Natural Kind.
(B) e term ‘knowledge’ denotes a co-occurring set of propertieswhich
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii).
(C) erefore, ‘knowledge’ denotes a natural kind.
(D) e referential content of natural kind terms is discovered empiri-
cally by investigating their locally-determined essence.
(E) If the referential content of natural kind terms is discovered empiri-
cally by the investigating their locally-determined essence, then the
referential content of such terms cannot be illuminated by a priori
analysis.
(5) erefore, a priori analysis cannot illuminate the natural kind(s)
that stand as the referential content of the term(s) contained within
its target domain.
Kornblith attempts to defend his rejection of conceptual analysis by ar-
guing that knowledge is a natural phenomenon, akin to gold or water.is
allows him to then claim that the reference of the kind term ‘Knowledge’ is
thus determined empirically, setting up the further claim (expressed in the
main argument) that a priori analysis cannot illuminate the target explanan-
dum.
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6.2 Objections and Implications
With Kornblith’s position reviewed, let me now provide a recap of my three
objections. I will then comment on why I think the objections in question
eectively challenge Kornblith’s desired methodological conclusions.
My rst two objections directly attacked the Natural Kinds subargu-
ment. More specically, aer demonstrating that Kornblith’s identication
of epistemic properties with Boydian natural kinds is a form of reductionism
(section 4.1), I raised the following two concerns:
(1) Multiple Realizeability: if reductionism is true, then it follows that
each epistemological kind (e.g. knowledge) is type-identical to a
particular physical kind. However, such epistemological kinds are
compatible with multiple physical base realizers. So the identity re-
lation fails to hold, and thus reductionism is false.
(2) Psychological Explanation: Pylyshyn puts forth the following antire-
ductionist objection. According to reductionism, the projectable
generalizations of a higher level mentalistic vocabulary should also
be capturable when deated into the vocabulary of a lower level re-
ducing (physical) kind. But given that multiple physical base kinds
can instantiate the relevant mentalistic kinds, mentalistic laws can
only be correlated with a non-projectable disjunct of physical pred-
icates. So, the relevant mentalistic generalizations simply disappear
when reconstrued on the physical level.
I then argued that this objection can serve as the basis for a constructive
dilemma aimed at premise (D) of Kornblith’s Natural Kinds subargument:
the constructive dilemma in question provides good reason for rejecting
(D) of the subargument, and hence leaves us with no good reason to accept
premise (5) of the exclusionary argument. In particular, it leaves us with no
good reason to accept premise (5)’s implication that ‘knowledge’ (’justica-
tion’, etc.) denotes a natural kind.
My third objection, rather than directly attacking theNatural Kinds sub-
argument, instead highlights an important disanalogy between epistemic
kinds as putative natural kinds and other natural kinds in order to pose a
problem for Kornblith’s methodology:
(3) Starting Points: If my disanalogy premise is correct, Kornblith is
forced to rely upon a priori analysis in order to justify his reliabilist
account of knowledge. However, his natural kinds view implies that
a priori analysis lacks justicatory power vis-à-vis the relevant tar-
get domain. us, I argue (granting the natural kinds view) that
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Kornblith can have no more justication for thinking that his reli-
abilist analysis of knowledge is any more successful at illuminating
the target explanandum than any of his armchair competitors, im-
plying a form of general epistemological scepticism.
In sum, I think that these three objections give us good reason to reject
Kornblith’s Exclusionary Argument. at is, once we draw out the reduc-
tionist tendencies of his a posteriori brand of epistemology, it appears to be
highly implausible, if not altogether untenable.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Matheson and Gordon Davis for comments.
Bibliography
Bealer, G. (1996). A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy, Philo-
sophical Studies 81: 121–142.
Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural Reduction, Bradford Books/MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Bickle, J. (2013). Multiple realizability, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), e Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2013 edn.
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/
multiple-realizability/
Bird, A. (2001). Necessarily, salt dissolves in water, Analysis 61: 267–274.
Block, N. (1997). Semantics, Conceptual Role. unpublished book chapter.
BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Boyd, R. (1980). Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does
not entail, inN. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvad
University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 67–106.
Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist, inG. Sayre-McCord (ed.),Moral
Realism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 181–228.
Bryson, A. andAlexander, D. (2012).e view from the armchair: Respond-
ing to Kornblith’s alternative to armchair philosophy, Essays in Philosophy
13: 161–181.
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental,Midwest Journal of Philoso-
phy 4: 73–122.
Nathan Robert Cockram 33
Cuneo, T. (2007). e Normative Web, Oxford University Press, New York.
Devitt, M. (1981). Designation, Columbia University Press, New York.
Fodor, J. (1974). Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working
hypothesis, Synthese 28: 97–115.
Fodor, J. (1975). Language ofought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 2nd edn, Bradford
Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Horgan, T. (1993). Nonreductivematerialism and the explanatory autonomy
of psychology, in S. J. Wagner and R.Warner (eds),Naturalism: A Critical
Appraisal, University of Notre Dame Press, New York, pp. 295–320.
Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction, Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1–26.
Kornblith, H. (2002). Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Kornblith, H. (2005). Replies to Alvin Goldman,Martin Kusch andWilliam
Talbott, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 427–441.
Kornblith, H. (2007). Naturalism and intuitions, in C. Beyer and A. Burri
(eds), Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope, Rodopi, Amster-
dam, pp. 27–49.
Kornblith, H. (ed.) (1985). Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Lynch, M. (2009). Truth value and epistemic expressivism, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 79: 76–97.
McGinn, C. (1975). A note on the essences of natural kinds,Analysis 35: 178–
180.
Nagel, E. (1961). e Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientic
Explanation, Harcourt, Brace &World, New York.
Papineau, D. (2009). Naturalism, in E. N. Zalta (ed.),e Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy.
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates, in W. H. Capitan and D. D.
Merrill (eds),Art,Mind andReligion, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pitts-
burgh, pp. 37–48.
34 Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism
Putnam, H. (1975). e meaning of ‘meaning’,Minnesota Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Science 7: 131–193.
Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). Computation and Cognition, Bradford Books/MIT,
Cambridge.
Quine, W. (1969). Epistemology naturalized, Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 69–90.
Sober, E. andWilson, D. S. (1998).UntoOthers:e Evolution andPsychology
of Unselsh Behaviour, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tye, M. (1992). Naturalism and the mental,Mind 101: 421–441.
